Resorting to the Dichotomous decision model, where individuals can make alternative decisions, we study two geometric approaches to construct all possible decisions tiling. Each decision tiling indicates the way the Nash equilibria co-exist and change with the relative decision preferences of the individuals. We find the Nash domains for the pure and mixed strategies and characterize the space of all parameters where the pure Nash equilibria are either cohesive or disparate. We show how the coordinates of the influence matrix together with the total number of individuals affect significantly the occurrence of bifurcations with and without overlaps between the pure strategies.
Introduction
The Dichotomous decision model is a recent game theoretical model introduced by Mousa et al. in 2014 (Mousa et al., 2014a) . In this model, there are just two possible decisions that individuals can make. For instance, they have to choose between yes or no, i.e. d ∈ D = {Yes, No}. The individuals will have to make decisions according to their preferences. The preferences have the interesting feature of taking into account not only how much the individuals like or dislike a certain decision but also the other individuals' decisions. This decision model has wide applications in real life and can be used to understand better the social interaction ( They studied the way saturation, boredom and frustration can lead to desperate strategies (if the individuals of same group will make different decisions), and no saturation situations can lead to cohesive strategies (if all the individuals belonging to a same group will make the same decision).
Ajzen (Ajzen, 2002) and Baker et al. (Baker et al., 2008) predict the way individuals turn intentions into behaviors and this prediction is the main goal in Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action theories.
Mousa et al. (Mousa et al., 2015a) show that groups are formed by individuals with the same utility, and a group is cohesive if every individual has a gain in his utility when other individuals of the same group make the same decision as his. Furthermore, they show that individuals in a same group can make different decisions at certain Nash equilibria. In a dynamical version of the decision model (Mousa et al., 2014a) , the authors exhibit solutions that are periodic attracting cycles and so the individuals can keep changing the probabilities that they use to make a decision or another around some thresholds. These thresholds show the appearance of hysteretic-like behavior in the decision models. As in dynamics (Mousa, 2013) , small changes in the parameters might imply the appearance and disappearance of the pure Nash equilibria. In this paper, we study two geometric approaches to construct all possible Nash eqilibria for the decisions tiling. We characterize the space of all parameters for the Dichotomous decision model, where the pure and mixed strategies are Nash equilibria, and we find the corresponding Nash domains. We will see how the coordinates of the influence matrix together with the total number of individuals encode all the relevant information for the existence of Nash equilibria strategies.
The existence of these equilibria is also related to size effect of the relative decision preferences for the individuals. The two approaches rise in making 289 different combinatorial classes of decision tiling by capturing the information that rises from the crowding type of individuals, reflecting the complexity of the yes-no decision model (Mousa et al., 2011a) . This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review the Dichotomous decision model and some main results introduced in (Mousa et al., 2014a), in Section 3, we study two different strategic approaches to construct geometrically all possible tilings and determine the Nash domains for the pure and mixed strategies and we conclude in Section 5
The Dichotomous decision model
In this section, we review the Dichotomous decision model introduced in (Mousa et al., 2014a) with some main results. In section 2.1 we introduce the decision model. In section 2.2 we study the pure Nash equilibria and in section 2.3 we study the mixed Nash equilibria.
Model set up.
The model has two types = { 1 , 2 } of individuals. Let 1 = {1, ⋯ , 1 } be the set of all individuals with type 1 , and let 2 = {1, ⋯ , 2 } be the set of all individuals with ∈ has to make one decision ∈ be the disjoint union. The individual = 1 ∐ 2 Let . 
= { , }
1 Similarly, we can consider that there is a single individual with type that has to make decisions, or we can also consider a mixed model using these two possibilities. ) .
The coordinates of the preference neighbors matrix indicate, for each type of individuals whose decision is d, whom they prefer, or do not prefer, to be with in each decision, i.e. the crowding type Let be the space of all strategies . For a given a strategy ∈ , let be the strategic decision matrix whose coordinates = (S) indicate the number of individuals with type , who make decision = ( 1
) . 
is the number of individuals with type 1 who make the decision 1 ( ; 1 , 2 ) = 1 + 11 ( 1 − 1) + 12 2 ; 1 ( ; 1 , 2 ) = 1 + 11 ( 1 − 1 − 1) + 12 ( 2 − 2 ) and the utility function 2 : × → ℝ of an individual with type 2 is defined by 2 ( ; 1 , 2 ) = 2 + 22 ( 2 − 1) + 21 1 ;
Given a strategy ∈ , the utility ( ) of an individual with type (i) is given by ( ) (S(i); 1 ( ), 2 ( )). If > 0, the individuals with type 1 prefer to decide , without taking into account the influence of the others. If = 0, the individuals with type 1 are indifferent to decide or , without taking into account the influence of the others. If < 0, the individuals with type 1 prefer to decide , without taking into account the influence of the others. with the same type prefer to make the same decision. A disparate strategy is a pure strategy that is not cohesive, i.e. a pure strategy in which there are some individuals with the same type who prefer to make different decisions. Hence, the cohesive strategy ( , ) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, ( , ) ∈ ( , ).
Moreover, the Nash domain ( , ) is the right-upper quadrant in the xy-plane (see Figure 1 ).
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Moreover, the Nash domain ( , ) is a right-lower quadrant in the xy-plane (see Figure 2 ).
Moreover, the Nash domain ( , ) is a left-upper quadrant in the -plane (see Figure 3 ). Hence, the cohesive strategy ( , ) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, ( , ) ∈ ( , ).
Moreover, the Nash domain ( , ) is a left-lower quadrant in the xy-plane (see Figure 4 ). 
Hence, if A 11 ≠ 0, then there is not a mixed Nash equilibrium with the property that 0 < 1 ≠ 2 < 1. Furthermore, if 22 ≠ 0, then there is not a mixed Nash equilibrium with the property that 0 < 1 ≠ 2 < 1. 
(ii) 2 = #{ ∈ 2 ∶ = 1} 2 = #{ ∈ 2 ∶ = };
(iii) 1 − ( 1 + 1 ) = #{ ∈ 1 ∶ = 0} 2 − ( 2 + 2 ) = #{ ∈ 2 ∶ = 0}.
For , ∈ {0, 1}, we observe that the ( 1 , 1 , ; 2 , 2 , ) mixed strategic set is equal to the ( 1 + 1 , 2 + 2 ) pure strategic set. Since individuals with the same type are identical, if a mixed strategy contained in the ( 1 , 1 , ; 2 , 2 , ) mixed strategic set is a Nash equilibrium, then all the strategies in the ( 1 , 1 , ; 2 , 2 , ) mixed strategic set are Nash equilibria. 
Geometric approaches in constructing Tilings
In this section, we study two strategic approaches to construct Nash domains. The two approaches are the global approach and the local approach. In the global approach, we will construct all possible tilings using the coordinates of the influence matrix. In the local approach, we will characterize all possible orders for the domains of the pure and mixed Nash equilibria in tilings using the coordinates of the influence matrix too. We should remark that all Figures displayed in Section 3 and Section 4 are all original and created by the authors themselves. In order to proceed, we need to introduce some auxiliary and generalized results. and U 2 (Y ; 1 , 2 ) ≥ U 2 (N; 1 , 2 − 1) , U 2 (N; 1 , 2 ) ≥ U 2 (Y ; 1 , 2 + 1) .
Hence, the proof of Theorem 3.1 follows by rearranging the terms in the previous inequalities. ■ Hence, ( 1 , 2 ) is the Nash Equilibrium domain of the ( 1 , 2 ) strategy (see Figure 5 ). Each geometric graph in Figure 5 is called a tiling results by joining the four quadrants described in Proof. We prove ( 1 , 2 ) = ( , ) and the proof for the other Nash domains follows similarly.
Substituting 1 by 1 and 2 by 2 in the horizontal and vertical thresholds stated in Theorem 3.1, we have that Hence, ( 1 , 2 ) = ( , ) and we conclude the proof. ■
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Journal of the Arab American University. Volume (3). Number (2)/2017 3.1. Global approach. We will see that the coordinates of the influence matrix together with the total number of individuals play a significant role to determine the Nash domains for a given strategy. We will also denote to the Nash domains ( 1 , 2 ) by ( 1 , 2 ) as being referred to the quadrants. We notify that a pair of thresholds ( ( , ), ( , )) (respectively, ( ( , ), ( , )), ( ( , ), ( , )), ( ( , ), ( , ))) form a corner for the quadrant ( , )(respectively, ( , ), ( , ), ( , )). We summarize the global approach by the following remark which provides a strategy for constructing all possible tilings:  We repeat the second and third items in a similar fashion, but with different locations;
 The ladders intersect the losangles in the points upper-down for 2 = 0, 1, . . . , 2 ;
 The ladders intersect the losangles in the points left-right for 1 = 0, 1, . . . , 1 .
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Abdelrahim M. and Alberto P. The following theorem determines the conditions that guarantee the existence of a strictly mixed Nash equilibrium for a given tiling. (i) if 12 21 > 0, then there is a strictly mixed strategies only in the Nash equilibria domain ( 1 , 2 ) for every pure strategy ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ \{ ∪ };
(ii) if 12 21 < 0, then there is a strictly mixed strategies only outside the Nash equilibria domain ( 1 , 2 ) for every pure strategy ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ \{ ∪ };
(iii) if 12 21 = 0, then there are no strictly mixed strategies for every pure strategy
Proof. By Contradiction. We proof case (i) and the proof of cases (ii)−(iii) follows similarly.
Assume that there is a strictly mixed Nash equilibrium strategy
in the Nash equilibria domain ( 1 , 2 ) for some occupation vector ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ { ∪ }.
Note that 12 21 > 0 implies that either 12 > 0 and 21 > 0 (individuals of a certain type affect positively the other type of individuals to chair a particular decision) or 12 < 0 and 21 < 0 (individuals of a certain type affect negatively the other type of individuals to chair a particular decision). If ( 1 , 2 ) = (0, 0), then = = 0 for all = 0, 1, ⋯ , 1 and = 0, 1, ⋯ , 2 which contradicts the fact that ∶ → [0, 1] is a strictly mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. Similarly, if ( 1 , 2 ) = ( 1 , 2 ), then = = 1 for all = 0, 1, ⋯ , 1 and = 0, 1, ⋯ , 2 which contradicts the fact that ∶ → [0, 1] is a strictly mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. If ( 1 , 2 ) = (0, 2 ) (resp. ( 1 , 2 ) = ( 1 , 0)), then = 0 for all = 0, 1, ⋯ , 1 (resp. = 0 for all = 0, 1, ⋯ , 2 ) which gives a contradiction too. ■
In Figure 10 We study the rotation in the pure Nash domains. Given the location of the pure strategies in the small white rectangles, We observe the following: If the signs of the coordinates ( 12 , 21 ) is (+, +), then the pure strategies are rotated to make new ordering given by the small red rectangles that appear in Figure 12 . The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small red rectangles.
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If the signs of the coordinates ( 12 , 21 ) is (+, −), then the pure strategies are rotated to make new ordering given by the small orange rectangles appear in Figure 13 . The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small orange rectangles.
If the signs of the coordinates ( 12 , 21 ) is (−, +), then the pure strategies are rotated to make new ordering given by the small green rectangles appear in Figure 14 . The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small green rectangles.
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If the signs of the coordinates ( 12 , 21 ) is (−, −), then the rotated to make new ordering given by pure strategies are the small blue rectangles appear in Figure 15 . The new order of the pure strategies moves to the small blue rectangles.
Mixed strategies in local approach
We study geometrically two cases where mixed strategies co-exist. We present the first case in section 4.1, where no intersection between the pure strategies occurs; the second case will be introduced in section 4.2, where an intersection between the pure strategies occurs.
No intersections between pure the strategies
Without loss of generality, we will consider the case where the signs of ( , ) is (+, +) and focus on the mixed strategies that occurs in the corresponding Figure 12 Proof. Note that if the mixed strategies ( 1 ± , 2 ± ) are located along the horizontal and vertical axes (see the black rectangles in Figure 16 ), then they become pure and given by Considering the case where ( 12 , 21 ) is (+, +). Thus, p and q may have now real values instated of being natural and their values are derived by applying the Pythagorean Theorem among the three sides of right triangles given in Figure 16 , which ends the proof. 
Bifurcations between pure strategies
In this section, we study geometrically the bifurcations between the pure strategies and see the signs effect of the coordinates of the influence matrix. In Figures 17, 19 , 20 and 18, we show all possible bifurcations between the pure strategies that may occur in the corresponding Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15, respectively.
In Figure 17 , we show the bifurcations between the pure strategies when ( , ) = (+, +).
The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies) on the horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 12 , respectively. The red rectangles represent the red rectangles in Figure 12 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We observe that there are three red overlaps between, where the mixed strategies may occur.
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The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies) on the horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 15 , respectively. The red rectangles represent the blue rectangles in Figure 15 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We observe that there are three red overlaps between, where the mixed strategies may occur. In Figure 19 , we show the bifurcations between the pure strategies when ( , ) = (+, −)). The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies) on the horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 15 , respectively. The red rectangles represent the orange rectangles in Figure 13 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We observe that there are no overlaps between. In Figure 20 , we show the bifurcations between the pure strategies when ( , ) = (−, +).
The blue, green and yellow rectangles represent the black rectangles (pure strategies) on the horizontal, vertical and diagonal axis in Figure 14 , respectively. The red rectangles represent the green rectangles in Figure 14 and they describe the shifts in the black ones. We observe that there are no overlaps between.
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Conclusions
Resorting to the Dichotomous decision model presented in (Mousa et al., 2014a), two geometric approaches have been studied to construct all possible decisions tilings in which pure and mixed Nash equilibria co-exist and change with the relative decision preferences of the individuals.
We have characterized all possible Nash domains for pure and mixed strategies and discussed the dependence of Nash equilibria on the parameters of the model. We have seen how the coordinates of the influence matrix and the total number of individuals can alter the order of the horizontal and vertical thresholds which allow the occurrence of bifurcations with and without overlaps between the pure strategies.
